The Shenzhen Stock Exchange website shows that the main board IPO review status of Beijing Bimai Sports Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Bimai Sports) has been changed to "inquiry," just 13 days after its IPO application was accepted — an unusually fast pace among companies planning to go public in recent years. This running-focused vertical brand, founded in 2012 by Zhang Zhiyong, former CEO of LI NING, submitted its prospectus on June 27.
The company's performance sheet is impressive. From 2023 to 2025, revenue grew from 1.066 billion yuan to 1.818 billion yuan, a three-year compound growth rate of approximately 30.59%; net profit attributable to parent company jumped from 55 million yuan to 235 million yuan; the weighted average ROE in 2025 reached 53.85%, achieving counter-cyclical expansion in a year when net profits of peers generally declined.
Behind the dazzling figures, however, lie structural issues repeatedly questioned by regulators and the market. More than 60% of revenue relies on the "Mizuno" authorization, R&D expense ratio has stayed below 1% for three consecutive years, only one physical store remains nationwide, and the actual controller carries approximately 175 million yuan in personal debt. Is this company, dubbed "Little Li Ning," a model of vertical growth or a case of "borrowed" prosperity?
Where to Begin: The "Li Ning DNA" of the Founding Team
To understand Bimai Sports, one must look at its founding team. Zhang Zhiyong was the twelfth founding employee of Li Ning and served as its CEO, during which time Li Ning's revenue grew from several hundred million yuan to nearly 10 billion yuan. After stepping down in 2012, Zhang founded Bimai Sports, bringing along a group of core "old guards" from the Li Ning system, earning Bimai the "Little Li Ning" label.
In terms of strategy and business structure, however, Bimai Sports differs significantly from Li Ning. Li Ning adheres to a "single brand, multi-category, multi-channel" strategy. Bimai Sports, on the other hand, operates a "dual-brand driven" model. Its proprietary brand "Bimai" was launched in 2015, focusing on the running vertical, with products covering multiple running scenarios, multiple product lines targeting different groups, and wide-last shoe designs tailored to the foot characteristics of Chinese runners.
On the authorized business side, the company obtained the brand licensing rights for the Japanese brand "Mizuno" in mainland China (excluding Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) through a wholly-owned subsidiary. The licensing agreement can be extended to 2031, and can be further extended to 2041 if agreed conditions are met. Mizuno business is the company's revenue mainstay.
Channel choices have adjusted with industry trends. In the early days, the company opened more than 200 offline stores, which were gradually closed due to limited audience and inventory backlog. Around 2020, with the rise of interest-based e-commerce, the company shifted to online channels such as Douyin, Tmall, and JD.com, establishing a sales system centered on online direct sales with "direct sales as the mainstay, multi-model collaboration," retaining only an experience center in Beijing's Chaoyang Park that combines sales and display functions. Revenue currently comes mainly from online, with a relatively concentrated channel structure.
Structural Dependence Draws Attention
In terms of performance, the company's revenue, net profit, and gross margin on main business have all increased year by year over the past three years. According to the prospectus, running shoe revenue in 2025 was approximately 1.064 billion yuan. Frost & Sullivan data shows Bimai ranks sixth among domestic running vertical brands and second among local running vertical brands (behind only Xtep).
Structurally, Bimai Sports' revenue is dominated by the authorized brand, with the proprietary brand accounting for less than 40%. During the reporting period, "Mizuno" revenue accounted for 68.73%, 62.13%, and 62.16% of main business revenue, while the proprietary "Bimai" brand accounted for approximately 35%. Clearly, this structure creates strong dependence on the licensor. Brand ownership belongs to Mizuno; Bimai Sports only holds licensing rights. Supply policies and revenue-sharing rules are controlled by the licensor. If the licensor adjusts cooperation terms or terminates the partnership, the company's operations would be directly affected. Consequently, brand authorization dependence has become a focal point of scrutiny in this IPO.
On R&D investment, the company's R&D expense ratio has been below the peer average for three consecutive years. The prospectus shows the company holds 46 patents, of which only 3 are invention patents — all acquired through transfer. R&D personnel account for less than 3% of staff. The company plans to increase R&D and digitalization investment through the fundraising projects, building an innovation and testing center with multiple functions, focusing on lightweighting, cushioning performance improvement, and new material applications, to establish a systematic verification system.
In scale, Bimai Sports' total assets, revenue, and net profit lag behind leading A-share sportswear companies. In the running shoe segment, first-tier brands all have revenue above 5 billion yuan, leaving Bimai Sports still in a catching-up position.
Is the Growth Path Sustainable?
As mentioned, Bimai Sports' sales channels are primarily online. A source from a leading domestic sporting goods company said that the online direct-sales model reduces intermediate circulation links, benefiting brand control and profit stability, but customer acquisition costs are rising. Bimai Sports' prospectus confirms this: platform service fees, commissions, promotion fees, and other marketing expenses have increased year by year, with the sales expense ratio still higher than some peers. "The running shoe category relies on actual foot feel; without offline try-on scenarios, consumer brand awareness and conversion rates may be affected," the source said.
Notably, Bimai Sports' production is primarily outsourced. Previously, finished goods were mainly OEM-produced (outsourced). After the Hunan production base began operations in October 2025, the company gained independent production capability for running shoes, currently forming a pattern of "OEM production as the mainstay, self-production as a supplement."
Looking at China's sportswear market, concentration among top brands remains high. Brands such as ANTA, LI NING, Xtep, and 361 Degrees continue to push mid-to-high-end technologies like cushioning and carbon plates down to mass-market price points, intensifying price competition for professional brands in the mid-to-low price range.
A marketing director from an overseas sports brand noted that demand in China's sporting goods consumption market still retains considerable growth potential. National fitness promotion continues to expand, the population participating in running is gradually increasing, and the number of marathon events keeps rising. Meanwhile, consumer demand for sportswear that fits specific sports scenarios and local foot characteristics is also gradually increasing.
Regarding the "Bimai" brand, several consumers in first-tier cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen said the brand has not engaged in large-scale celebrity endorsements or event sponsorships, resulting in relatively limited public awareness. Its category focus is concentrated on road running, with a relatively narrow scenario coverage.
Beyond operational aspects, the actual controller's personal debt has also drawn attention. The prospectus shows that actual controller Zhang Zhiyong has approximately 175 million yuan in unpaid loans, maturing between 2027 and 2028. Together with board secretary Wang Yalei, the total unpaid loans amount to approximately 191 million yuan. If Bimai Sports successfully lists, Zhang's indirect shareholding through the controlling shareholder will be subject to a 36-month lock-up period, which overlaps with debt maturity — meaning he cannot sell shares to repay debts during the lock-up. Additionally, the company distributed approximately 136 million yuan in dividends before filing, with about 82.81 million yuan paid out on the eve of the filing.
The content above is for reference only and does not constitute investment advice. Investors should operate at their own risk.